The Effect of GHG Emission, Environmental Performance, and Social Performance on Financial Performance of Listed Manufacturing Firms in Indonesia  by Rokhmawati, Andewi et al.
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  211 ( 2015 )  461 – 470 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
1877-0428 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of the 2nd GCBSS-2015
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.11.061 
2nd Global Conference on Business and Social Science-2015, GCBSS-2015, 17-18 September 
2015, Bali, Indonesia 
The Effect of GHG Emission, Environmental Performance, and 
Social Performance on Financial Performance of Listed 
Manufacturing Firms in Indonesia 
Andewi Rokhmawatia*, Milind Sathyeb, Suneeta Sathyec 
a,b,cThe Faculty of Business, Government, and Law University of Canberra, 2617, Australia 
Abstract 
The study aims to understand the effect of GHG emissions, environmental performance (EP), and social performance (SP) on 
financial performance (FP) of listed manufacturing firms in Indonesia. Sampling was based on the availability of the firms’ annual 
reports 2011 and interview feedback about the type and amount of fossil fuels and electricity consumed by the firms in 2011. Firm 
FP was measured in return on assets (ROA). GHG emissions were measured in CO2e intensity. Firm EP was measured in a dummy 
variable of PROPER rating. Firm SP was measured as social reporting scores developed through a content analysis. We found that 
CO2e intensity and social reporting scores have a positive and significant effect on ROA. The coefficient of PROPER rating was 
not significant. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior studies on firm SP examine the relationship between firm SP and firm FP (for example Gray, 2006; Van 
Beurden and Gössling, 2008; and Margolis et al., 2009). Firm EP was included in the firm SP itself. The increasing 
concern about environmental issues motivates many researchers to separate environmental dimensions from social 
dimensions. Accordingly, studies (for example Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Montabon et al., 2007; and Nakao et al., 2007)  
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were conducted which separately measured firm SP and firm EP. Most of the prior studies using environmental 
dimensions do not capture the issues of GHG emissions. In recent years, in line with the growing concern about the 
issues of climate change, there have been increasing efforts in research to use GHG emissions as one of the 
measurements of firm EP, as these emissions can have a significant effect on the business environment and firm 
operations. The existing research has been conducted to examine the relationship between GHG emissions and firm 
FP (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011; Iwata and Okada, 2011; Hatakeda et al., 2012; Delmas and Nairn-Birch, 2010). GHG 
emissions may have an effect on firm performance in several ways. Firstly, the Kyoto Protocol ratification may drive 
a systematic change in the business environment which impacts firm performance. Furthermore, governments may 
introduce carbon regulations, such as a carbon tax (in Australia), a carbon trading scheme (in the EU), or energy 
management (in Indonesia) as part of their commitment to reduce GHG emissions as mandated in the Kyoto Protocol. 
The carbon tax, carbon trading scheme or the introduction of energy management would increase costs and risk to 
firm operations (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011). Secondly, firm stakeholders such as governments, customers, trading 
partners, employees, investors and creditors become more concerned about the issues of climate change (Brinkman et 
al., 2008). These factors may increase firm costs (Busch and Hoffmann, 2011). To be successful in the long run, firms 
need to address these issues and manage their business by incorporating climate change into their strategic decisions 
(Kolk and Pinkse, 2005). While there are enormous study to examine the relationship between firm SP and firm FP, 
between firm EP and firm FP; there are limited studies that have been conducted to examine the relationship between 
GHG emissions and firm FP. This study, therefore, proposes to fill the significant gap in the literature by providing 
empirical evidence of the relationship between GHG emissions and firm FP. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 reviews theory and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology and data. Section 4 presents 
results and analysis. The last section describes the conclusion. 
2. Theory and hypotheses  
2.1. Relationship between GHG emissions and firm financial performance 
The relationship between firm GHG emissions and firm FP can be explained by instrumental stakeholder theory 
(Jones, 1995), which suggests that if a firm wants to be more successful in the long run, it must pay attention to 
stakeholders’ interests. Stakeholders can be defined as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization objectives’ (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). Ignoring stakeholders’ interests will make it 
difficult for a firm to achieve its goals (Jensen, 2001), as the negative reactions of stakeholders are likely to increase 
costs (Berman et al., 1999). The introduction of climate regulation and the shifting behaviours of environmentally 
conscious stakeholders cause GHG emissions to become a more notable risk to firms, with a growing movement 
towards a low-carbon economy. Climate regulation and stakeholders’ pressure on firms to respond to GHG emissions 
may affect FP if firms do not respond to the pressure. This will make it easy or difficult for a firm to achieve its 
objective of ‘maximising firm value’ through improving FP, and vice versa. Further, Porter and van de Linde (1995) 
suggest that firms may earn benefits because the government imposes powerful environmental regulations. Such 
regulations play a role in motivating firms to innovate and innovation allows firms to reduce costs and improve their 
competitiveness. In contrast, where regulations are ineffective, firms tend to delay their response to the development 
of a low-carbon economy (Porter and van der Linde, 1995), which may not result in serious legal problems. It can be 
concluded that with stakeholders’ pressure and powerful environmental regulations, GHG emissions will have a 
negative effect on FP. Conversely, with a low level of stakeholders’ pressure and ineffective environmental 
regulations, GHG emissions will have a positive effect on firm FP. To examine this statement, the following 
hypothesis is proposed. 
Ha1 CO2e intensity of firms has a significant effect on ROA 
2.2. Relationship between firm EP and firm financial performance  
To connect firm EP and firm FP, Porter’s competitive advantage theory can be used. An increase in stakeholders’ 
pressure drives firms to be more responsible for minimising their negative effects on the environment. Failure to 
respond to the pressure will make it difficult for firms to achieve their goals. In contrast, success in responding to 
pressure will allow firms to more easily achieve their goals by recognising the opportunities in environmental issues. 
Porter and van de Linde (1995) suggest that firms must start to recognise the opportunity to make money from 
463 Andewi Rokhmawati et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  211 ( 2015 )  461 – 470 
environmental issues rather than viewing them as detrimental costs or threats. To do so, they can implement a least-
cost strategy of competitive advantage theory (Hoffman, 2006) through the implementation of eco-efficiency and 
environmental cost leadership (Orsato, 2006), which stress the reduction of the costs of production and waste disposal. 
It allows firms to reduce or change their emissions and waste discharge through better housekeeping, material 
substitution and recycling in the production process. Accordingly, an increase in the efficiency of production will 
result in better utilisation of inputs, replacement of polluting inputs, savings from recycling or reusing materials, and 
a reduction in waste disposal costs (Schmidheiny, 1992). This may also enable firms to cut compliance and liability 
costs by committing to reduce emissions well below the required levels (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). However, 
it will not be the case if stakeholders are less concerned about environmental issues (i.e., as long as the firm does not 
break the law) than their profitability. The improvement of the firm EP following an increase in costs will be responded 
negatively by stakeholders. It can be concluded that firm EP will have either a positive or negative effect on firm FP. 
In this research, environmental performance will be measured using a PROPER rating. To examine the effect of firm 
EP on firm FP, the following hypothesis meets this objective: 
Ha2  PROPER rating of firms has a significant effect on ROA. 
2.3. Relationship between firm EP and firm FP  
When a firm fails to contribute to social development, preserve environmental sustainability and deliver financial 
benefits despite stakeholders’ pressure, it can damage its reputation. Investors and creditors will lose confidence and 
this will consequently increase the cost of equity and debt. Absenteeism and staff turnover may also increase because 
of poor working condition. Local communities and NGOs may take legal action if the firm does not comply with 
social rules and environmental regulations. Further, the government may impose penalties. Accordingly, this will 
increase the costs of the firm. Conversely, if a firm can fulfil stakeholders’ expectations, it is likely to achieve benefits, 
including maximising profits and increasing the value of the firm (Jensen, 2001, Andriof and Waddock, 2002). In 
instrumental stakeholder theory, Jones (1995) argues that firms that work on the basis of honest, trusting and ethical 
relationships will be rewarded by stakeholders in terms of positive reputation effects, thereby making these firms 
suitable business partners. By extension, firms that are high/low in firm SP should benefit/be at a disadvantage 
financially from their positive/negative interactions with stakeholders. Hence, firm SP will have a positive/negative 
effect on firm FP. To examine the effect of firm SP on firm FP, the following hypothesis is established: 
Ha3 Social performance reporting scores have a significant effect on ROA. 
3. Data  
This study uses primary data to measure GHG emissions. The primary data were collected by interviewing a key 
person from each firm who had knowledge about the type and the amount of fossil fuels and electricity consumed by 
the firms in 2011. These data were converted into the kilogram of CO2e by using the UK calculation system of 
Guidance on How to Measure and Report Your GHG Emissions (DEFRA, 2011). However, this research excluded 
indirect emissions that are not under the control of the firm, such as the activities associated with outsourced activities. 
The data of PROPER rating were secondary data published by the Indonesian Ministry of Environment. The data of 
social performance is collected from the firms’ annual report in 2011 through content analysis. The sampling frame 
for this study comprises all listed manufacturing firms in Indonesia. Sampling was based on the availability of firms’ 
annual reports in 2011, and the interview feedback. Of the 131 listed manufacturing firms that published their annual 
report in 2011,102 firms provided feedback. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in this study is firm FP, which is measured by ROA. ROA is the ability of a firm to utilise 
its total assets to produce profits for shareholders, bondholders and creditors (Carton and Hofer, 2006). ROA in this 
research is computed using Formula 1 which has been proposed by Carton and Hofer, 2006. ROA is noted for return 
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on assets; NI is noted for net income; TA is noted for total assets; i is noted for firm i; 2011 is noted for end of year 
2011; 2010 is noted for end of year 2010. 
୧ǡଶ଴ଵଵ ൌ
୒୍౟ǡమబభభ
౐ఽ౟ǡమబభభశ౐ఽ౟ǡమబభబ
మ
 (1) 
4.2. Independent variables 
Independent variables in this study is CO2e intensity as the proxy of GHG emissions, a dummy variable of PROPER 
rating as the measurement of firm EP, and social reporting scores assessed through content analysis to measure firm 
SP.  
CO2e intensity is measured as the ratio of kilogram of CO2e to cost of goods sold. CO2e intensity measures how 
efficient every unit currency of cost of goods sold to produce GHG emissions; the higher the CO2e intensity, the lower 
the efficiency. CO2e intensity is formulated as follows where carbon intensity is CO2e intensity; CO2e is carbon 
dioxide equivalent; CGS is cost of goods sold; and i is firm i. 
ଶ୧ǡଶ଴ଵଵ ൌ
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൬
ిృ౏౟ǡమబభభశిృ౏౟ǡమబభబ
మ ൰
 (2) 
Firm EP is measured in a dummy variable of the PROPER rating assessed by the Indonesian Ministry of 
Environment. In the PROPER rating system, firm EP is shown using five colours from the lowest to the highest 
ranking: black, red, blue, green and gold. Black is awarded for firms that have facilities without pollution control 
efforts. Red is awarded for those that have made some efforts to control pollution, but have insufficient reporting. A 
firm with facilities that meet legal standards and that provides reasonably regular reporting is given a blue rating. 
Green is given to firms that are proactive in reducing pollution and when the level of pollution produced is significantly 
below legally required standards. Further, they also maintain their equipment and regularly report activities associated 
with their efforts to reduce pollution and work on environmental issues. Finally, a gold rating is granted to firms that 
comply with the legal requirements that are set to achieve a green rating, and that fulfil some additional requirements, 
such as the use of clean production technology, waste minimisation and pollution prevention activities. They also 
conform to international standards of excellence (Kementrian Lingkungan Hidup, 2011). The PROPER program 
assesses firms based on several criteria, including water and air pollution control, management of hazardous waste 
and toxic materials, and the implementation of EIAs. Although air pollution control is introduced in the PROPER 
program, the criteria assessment of air pollution is based on the applicability of the regular control of air emissions 
and the availability of installed tools to monitor the concentration of SO2 and particulates released through 
smokestacks. GHG emissions acknowledged by the IPCC include CO2, N2O, CH4, SF6, PFC5 and HFC5 which cause 
climate change are not calculated in the PROPER assessment. The PROPER assessment does not assess the amount 
of CO2e produced by a factory in which CO2e is closely related to the level of factory consumption of fossil fuel 
energy and electricity. Hence, there may be no problems associated with the issue of multicollinearity between the 
variable of GHG emissions and firm EP, as is statistically required in the multiple regression analysis. In this study, 
firms with PROPER ratings of blue, green and gold were categorised as high and were given value of one. This 
classification has been chosen because the blue rating is the minimum required standard for meeting the regulations. 
Firms with PROPER ratings of red and black, and firms with no PROPER rating were categorised as low and were 
given value of zero.  
Firm SP is measured in social reporting score collected through content analysis from the firms’ annual report in 
2011. Content analysis is a technique that involves organising text into categories based on selected criteria. The 
ultimate goal of this method is to transform qualitative material into quantitative scales that allow further analysis 
(Weber, 1990). Besides focusing on the overall volume of the disclosed items or words, this research also focuses on 
the quality of the disclosed information or activities. The quality is assessed based on four coding schemes: content, 
forms of disclosure, timescale and type of news as developed by Placke et al. (2010). Firstly, the disclosed information 
is codified based on their content. To codify it, this research follows the guidelines provided by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI, 2013). This research only includes the contents of social responsibility; it omits environmental and 
economic contents to avoid the problem of multicollinearity with the measurement of firm EP. The social indicators 
are grouped into four groups: labour practices and acceptable workplace environment, human rights, society, and 
product responsibility. Secondly, the disclosed information is codified based on forms of disclosure, which are 
classified into two categories: qualitative content (words) and quantitative content (numbers, tables, diagrams). 
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Thirdly, the disclosed information is codified based on timescale, which is divided into three timeframes: past, non-
time and future. Past content means that certain activities are related to past events. Non-time content means that 
certain information is neutral information that is not related to past or future events. Future content means that certain 
activities are related to future events (Placke et al., 2010). Fourthly, the disclosed information or activities are codified 
based on type of news, which is divided into three subcategories: good, bad and neutral news (Placke et al., 2010). 
After establishing the analysis scheme, a weighting is developed to overcome the problems associated with unbalanced 
revelations between past and future events, between qualitative and quantitative data, and between good and bad news. 
The detailed weight for each theme is provided in Appendix A. Each disclosed data or information are assigned a 
score.  This research uses a seven-point Likert scale to assign a score. Score ‘zero’ is assigned for no mention of a 
given social indicator. Score ‘one’ is assigned if a given social indicator is mentioned but only in reference to another 
document or statement. Score ‘two’ is assigned if a given social indicator is briefly mentioned. Score ‘three’ is 
assigned if a given social indicator is discussed with some detail but not extensive detail. Score ‘four’ is assigned if a 
given social indicator is discussed in detail. Score ‘five’ is assigned if a given social indicator is discussed with details 
that comprise more than 50 per cent of the document text (Placke et al., 2010). Score ‘six’ is assigned if a document 
is completely dedicated to the discussion of a given social indicator.  
This research also includes three control variables in the analysis: firm size, firm risk (leverage), and firm capital 
intensity. Firstly, firm size is a determinant that influences the ability and propensity of a firm to make voluntary GHG 
disclosures and to improve its pollution-abatement performance (Freedman and Jaggi, 2005). In this research, firm 
size is measured as the logarithm natural (LN) of a firm’s sales in 2011 to make the data smoother. The formulation 
of firm size is as Formula 3, where Ln is logarithm natural; NS is net sales, and i is firm i. 
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Secondly, this research uses the firm leverage ratio as the proxy for firm risk as suggested by Iwata and Okada (2011). 
Leverage measures the extent to which a firm’s assets are financed by debt. It is a measurement of firm long-term 
risk. Leverage is computed using Formula 4, where, D is total debt; TA is total assets, and i is firm I (Citibank, 1994): 
௜ǡଶ଴ଵଵ ൌ 
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 (4) 
Thirdly, firm capital intensity is the amount of money invested in order to receive one dollar of output. This is 
measured as the ratio of assets to sales (Russo and Fouts, 1997). Firms that are considered more capital-intensive 
produce the same units of production but need more invested capital. A Capital intensity can be computed using 
Formula 5. Where, TA is total assets; NS is net sales; and i is firm name. 
୧ǡଶ଴ଵଵ ൌ 
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మ
 (5) 
To examine the relationship between independent and dependent variables, this research develops a multiple 
regression model. The multiple regressions conducted to test the proposed hypotheses are to perform the goodness-
of-fit test, the F test and the t test. The regression model used in this study can be seen as follows, Where: β0 is noted 
for constant variable; β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6 are noted for regression coefficients; i is noted for firm name; t is noted for 
time t; Ɛ is noted for error term. 
୧ǡ୲ ൌ Ⱦ଴ ൅Ⱦଵଶ୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ⱦଶ୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ⱦଷ୧ǡ୲ ൅
Ⱦସ	୧ǡ୲൅Ⱦହ	୧ǡ୲ ൅Ⱦ଺୧ǡ୲൅ɂ୧  (6) 
Before conducting regression analysis, a series of tests for normality of residuals, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and linearity will be conducted to fulfil the classical assumptions of multiple regression analysis 
(Gupta, 1999). The regression model that meets the classical assumption will be assigned for the purpose of analysis 
in this research. 
  
466   Andewi Rokhmawati et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  211 ( 2015 )  461 – 470 
5. Results and Analysis 
Descriptive statistics of each variable are reported in Table 1. The sample size is no longer 102 because there are 
some cases omitted due to outliers. Although several data are omitted, the rest samples are still big enough as Kline 
(2005) recommends that a realistic target of a sample size is considered to have a ratio 10: 1 of independent variables. 
If a model includes six independent variables, then the sample size should be minimum sixty cases. 
     Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LNROA 90 .602950 .799570 .72547844 .032853845 
LNCO2eINTENSITY 90 -12.487850 -4.258030 -9.39699367 1.465040470 
LNSOCIAL 90 -.51793 2.10531 .9810168 .54707343 
LNFIRMSIZE 90 23.8974 32.7221 27.972530 1.6426169 
LNLEVERAGE 90 -1.9356 1.1393 -.692835 .5186757 
INCAPINT 90 -1.26833 1.22043 -.0222553 .51492496 
Valid N (listwise) 90         
 Source: Computed data 
Table 2 presents the estimation results that the regression is already tested from classical assumption.  
     Table 2. Summary of Regression Coefficients and the Sig Value 
Constant .604 t Sig  .000 
LN CO2e intensity .005 t Sig  .008** 
PROPER -.013 t Sig  .070 
Social Reporting Score .012 t Sig  .041** 
LN Firms size .005 t Sig  .007** 
LN Leverage -.027 t Sig  .000** 
LN Capital Intensity -.025 t Sig  .000** 
F 12.746 F Sig  .000** 
R2  .480 
No. of firms  90 
      Source: Computed data 
      ** Significance at the 5 per cent level 
5.1. The effect of CO2e intensity on ROA  
The effects of CO2e Intensity are statistically significant on ROA but the sign is positive. It means that the increase 
in GHG emissions is followed by the increase in ROA significantly. This result is not in line with the results of Busch 
and Hoffmann (2011), who used carbon intensity as the measurement of carbon performance. The results show that 
carbon performance has no relation to ROA. Further, the results of this study are not in line with the findings of Iwata 
and Okada (2011) either, who found that GHG emission has a significant negative effect on ROA. Meanwhile, the 
results of this study are in line with Hatakeda et al., (2012), who found that GHG emissions have a positive significant 
effect on profitability. This research is also in line with the result of Delmas and Nairn-Birch (2010), who suggested 
that firms with lower carbon footprints earn smaller ROA, vice versa. They argue that carbon regulation is not enforced 
in the US, so firms with high GHG emissions can still generate more profit (Delmas and Nairn-Birch, 2010). In such 
conditions, firms will increase their revenue if they increase their GHG emissions because they have not internalised 
the costs associated with carbon. Further, to date, no financial incentives have been provided for firms to reduce their 
GHG emissions (Delmas and Nairn-Birch, 2010). The reasoning behind the positive effect of GHG emissions on firm 
FP in these studies is similar to the reasoning of the present study conducted in Indonesia. In Indonesia, financial 
incentives are provided, but they are not enough to compensate the costs of forcing firms to reduce their GHG 
emissions. The reasons for the positive significant effect of GHG emissions on firm FP can be explained as follows. 
Although the Indonesian government established Regulation No. 70/2009 regarding ‘energy management’, which 
calls for industrial sectors to contribute to reducing their GHG emissions, the regulation appears to be ineffective in 
forcing firms to reduce their emissions. Many firms are still not concerned about the regulation. According to the 
Indonesian Directorate of Energy Conservation, most participating firms in ‘energy management’ are reluctant to 
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complete energy audit recommendations because of the requirement of expensive investments (APEC, 2012). 
Indonesia imposes penalties on firms that do not meet the regulation (Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, 
2012). The penalty imposed to firms that do not meet the regulation when one month after the second warning is 
received but the firms still disregard the warning. The fine is set at twice the value of the wastage caused. The value 
of wastage refers to 5 per cent of the energy costs consumed by the user for a one-year reporting period (Kementerian 
Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, 2012). Surprisingly, although the government imposes penalties, firms still appear 
to disregard the regulation. This may be because the penalties for infringement seem to be very light. According to 
Sitepu (2013), based on the 2010 data of Indonesian statistics, the contribution of fossil fuels and energy costs to the 
total cost of production is about 2.69 per cent for fossil fuels and 2.70 per cent for electricity. Hence, the contribution 
of fossil fuels and electricity costs to the total cost of production is about 5.39 per cent. This condition will make firms 
weight whether the benefit of non-compliance is more than the cost of non-compliance. Additionally, the incentive 
provided seems unattractive. The unattractive incentives may be because the energy-audit recommendation requires 
a large investment (APEC, 2012). To finance the investment, firms need large commercial loans that require collateral. 
The Indonesian government seems to lack reasonable financial incentives, so firms disregard GHG emissions. This 
condition will make firms decide whether the benefit of compliance is more than the cost of compliance. If they do 
not comply with the regulation, the penalties appear to be affordable, but if they decide to comply with the regulation, 
they must invest in expensive technology that is difficult to meet. 
5.2. The effect of PROPER rating on ROA  
The announcement of the PROPER rating by the Indonesian Ministry of Environment was intended to encourage 
firms to be more responsible to the environment. Based on instrumental stakeholder theory (Jones, 1995), it may be 
concluded that if a firm has a good PROPER rating, it may obtain good access to funding, as the Indonesian Central 
Bank obligates commercial banks in Indonesia to assess firm EP (The Central Bank of Indonesia, 2005). This means 
that firms with good EP may receive a lower interest rate. This will lead to lower cost of debt. Further, the Ministry 
of Environment may take legal action against firms that receive and ignore a black rating (Kementrian Lingkungan 
Hidup, 2011). Consequently, such firms face high risks; either they have to improve their EP following the 
government’s recommendation or they must close their facilities (factories) if they fail to meet the recommendation. 
Further, firms with good EP may improve their reputation by increasing trust-levels among their consumers (Carbon 
Trust, 2005). However, the statistical results show that the coefficient is not significant. The result of this study is in 
line with several studies conducted in Indonesia that use the PROPER rating as the measurement of EP (see Sarumpaet, 
2005; Muliati et al., 2014; Saridewi, and Koesrindartoto, 2014). Conversely, this result does not support the result of 
Hart and Ahuja (1996) and Russo and Fouts (1997). Firms may receive benefit from preparing a PROPER rating but 
they may also incur costs to prepare the PROPER rating. This could explain why the coefficient of PROPER rating is 
not significant. On the one hand, it is mandated for commercial banks to assess firm EP in giving loans. Indeed, a 
good PROPER rating increases the points of environmental assessment given by a bank. Nevertheless, PROPER rating 
is not the only assessment of EP. Firms may have another rating of EP, such as ISO 14001 or EMAS. Furthermore, if 
firms do not have a PROPER rating or do not have ISO 14001 or EMAS certification, commercial banks may assess 
firm EP based on firm reports about environmental impact analysis (known as AMDAL). Based on the Indonesian 
Government Regulation No. 27/1999 renewed with the Indonesian Government Regulation No. 27/2012, firms are 
mandated to provide an AMDAL report periodically to the local governments. The report is not published publicly. 
Good assessment of EP will reduce costs of debt that eventually will increase profits. On the other hand, Indonesian 
consumers do not require a PROPER certificate to ensure that the product is safe and meets the required standard in 
Indonesia. They require a certificate that is called Indonesian National Standard (Badan Standarisasi Nasional, 2012). 
Furthermore, for international customers, they do not require a PROPER certificate; they usually require an 
international certification such as ISO 14001 and EMAS. It is known that preparing a PROPER report costs firms both 
money and time. In fact, the PROPER rating is voluntary and it is not mandated by the government or customers 
locally or abroad. These opposing factors between the benefits from having a PROPER rating and the costs of 
preparing the PROPER report may offset each other. This situation causes the PROPER rating to not have a significant 
effect on firm FP. The justification described in this part is strengthened by the finding of Sarumpaet’s study (2005) 
concluded that ISO 14001 has a positive and significant relationship with firm FP but PROPER rating does not have 
a significant relationship with firm FP. 
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5.3. The effect of social reporting score on ROA  
The social reporting score has a positive significant effect on ROA. The better the social reporting score, the better 
the firm FP. The way that firms manage labour practices and provide acceptable workplaces, and their stance on 
human rights, and social and product responsibility have a positive effect on firm FP. There are two channels of firms’ 
social performance that affect firm FP: an increase in revenues and a decrease in costs. The improvement of product 
responsibility may retain loyal customers and draw new customers so that sales increase. By treating consumers and 
trading partners well, providing consumers with excellent service, ensuring that products are safe, and meeting the 
expectations of consumers and trading partners, consumers and trading partners will respond to firms’ efforts by 
buying the products repeatedly. Further, how firms manage labour practices, human rights issues and social 
responsibility may reduce labour turnover and absenteeism, and a lower level of work accidents may increase 
labourers’ productivity because of increased satisfaction. Conversely, unacceptable workplaces, disrespect human 
rights, and unacceptable social and product responsibility will directly cost firms. Firms that treat their labourers 
poorly are vulnerable to strike actions, which will result in declining production levels, increasing penalties from 
shipment delays and failure to meet promises made to customers. This result is in line with studies by Griffin and 
Mahon (1997), Setiawan and Darmawan (2011) and Margolis et al. (2007), who concluded that firm social 
responsibility has a positive effect on ROA. 
6. Conclusion 
This section described a regression model used to test the study’s hypotheses. The dependent variable of firm FP 
was measured in ROA. Further, there were six independent variables: CO2e intensity, dummy variable of PROPER 
rating, social reporting score, firm size, firm leverage, and capital intensity. The main objectives of this paper were to 
examine of effects of GHG emissions, firm EP, and firm SP on firm FP. 
The results have shown that CO2e intensity has a significant positive effect on ROA. The positive significant effect 
of CO2e intensity on ROA implies that Indonesia lacks reasonable financial incentives for reducing GHG emissions 
and low penalties for increasing GHG emissions. Current condition of Indonesia described above creates an 
uncertainty so that in the short run, running business as usual may be the best way for Indonesian firms. Nevertheless, 
to be survive in a long-run, firms should reduce the uncertainty. Firms should incorporate GHG emissions into their 
strategic decision. Hence, firms with machines or technology that the economic life is nearly finished should replace 
them with an efficient one. This research therefore has policy implications. This research may help the Indonesian 
government and policy makers in supporting their manufacturing industries to deal with the climate change and GHG 
emissions, particularly to deal with Regulation No. 70/2009. The main objective in supporting the manufacturing 
industry is to encourage this industry to be actively involved into the initiative of the government to reduce GHG 
emissions without destroying and even enhancing their competitiveness. Win-win solution is the main purpose of the 
initiative. The reduction targets of GHG emissions can be achieved while the industries’ competitiveness is still able 
to grow and be enhanced. Besides, strong law enforcement, a powerful and influential regulation can be a critical 
driver for achieving this goal. Therefore, it is important for the Indonesian government and policy makers to develop 
a powerful and influential regulation. The result also shows that the coefficient of dummy variable of PROPER rating 
was not significant. It implies that the PROPER rating publication did not benefit participating firms because the 
coefficient was negative. This may be because the participatory of PROPER program is voluntary. This has 
implication for policy. The government should formulate a regulation that enforce firms to participate in the PROPER 
program. Finally, the result also shows that social reporting score has a positive and significant effect on ROA. It 
implies that the GRI guidelines can be used to assess firm SP. Hence, it may be concluded that in business practices 
firms could be benefited if they meet the GRI guidelines to deal with social activities.    
Our results have some implications for future research. Although our results are new to the existing literature, there 
is a caution to the one year data in 2011. A one-year period may not capture the long-term effects of GHG emissions. 
This is because the Indonesian government had just started to pay attention to GHG emissions in the industrial sector 
which is manifested by the introduction of Regulation No. 70/2009 about ‘energy management.’ Using a longer panel 
data may improve the weakness of this research. Time series data will provide the trend of GHG emissions produced 
by firms. Further, future studies may compare between before and after the Regulation No. 70/2009 was released. 
Comparing different periods will provide information regarding whether there has been a reduction of GHG emissions 
after the implementation of the regulation. 
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Appendix A: Detailed weight for each theme 
Themes of Contents based on the GRI framework of Social Performance Subsectional Weighting 
Reporting 
Weighting 
Reporting 
Social Performance  50% 
 Labour practices and acceptable 
workplace environment 
 30%  
  Employment   
  Labour/management relations   
  Health and safety   
  Training and education   
  Diversity and opportunity   
  Equal remuneration   
 Human rights  15%  
  Non-discrimination   
  Assessment   
 Society  35%  
  Community   
  Anti-corruption and bribery   
  Anti-competitive behaviour   
  Compliance with regulation   
 Product responsibility  20%  
  Customer health and safety   
  Product service labelling   
  Customer satisfaction   
  Marketing communication   
Form of Disclosure  20% 
 Qualitative 60%  
 Quantitative 40%  
Timescale  10% 
 Past 45%  
 Non-time (neutral) 25%  
 Future 30%  
Type of News  20% 
 Good 60%  
 Bad 15%  
 Neutral 25%  
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